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MISSION TO ASSESS FUTURE SUSTAINABLE OPTIONS OF THE LAO 
UXO TRUST FUND AND THE UXO LAO MINE ACTION PROGRAMME:  
MISSION REPORT 
1. Executive Summary 
This mission was intended to focus on ways to allow the mine action program 
in Lao PDR to be maintained on a sustainable basis. As a result, comment on 
many of the things that are successful about the program is restricted. It is 
therefore worth mentioning briefly here that the program has been notably 
successful in developing the technical capacity to deal with UXO 
contamination. 
The early sections of the report set out the terms of reference for the mission, 
a summary of the background to the current situation and the major issues 
now facing the program. The major reported concerns amongst stakeholders1 
are: 
• A problem in communication and coordination at all levels 
• A perceived lack of transparency, exacerbated by the communication 
problems 
• The lack of a strategic plan, with subsequent difficulties in comparing 
inputs with outputs and determining a suitable exit strategy for donor 
assistance 
• Lack of Government of Lao contribution to the program, both in terms of 
cash support and inclusion of the UXO issue in the general development 
process and documentation 
• Difficulties for donors to support the current vertically and horizontally 
integrated structure of UXO Lao, especially in terms of paying staff 
salaries when the staff are, in effect, Lao civil servants 
This report sets out some ideas for scoping the contamination problem in Lao 
PDR and suggests ways by which priority areas could be identified. This leads 
to means by which long, medium and short-term strategic action plans could 
be developed and an exit strategy for international assistance established. A 
10-year intensive plan with international support is suggested, with the 
Government of Lao taking on full responsibility for maintaining the UXO 
response capacity that will be needed to deal with the residual contamination. 
There are also a number of suggestions for improving cost effectiveness and 
developing the role of UNDP in supporting the program. 
The report then identifies two options for restructuring the UXO program that 
address stakeholder concerns. Both, however, would require the separation of 
the coordination, planning and regulatory functions from those of 
                                                
1
 There are a number of other concerns, which are set out in the body of the report. 
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implementation, not least to allow higher-level managers to focus on strategic 
issues rather than being bogged down in the logistic detail for implementation. 
Finally, the report sets out a number of suggestions for improving resource 
mobilisation. 
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MISSION TO ASSESS FUTURE SUSTAINABLE OPTIONS OF THE LAO 
UXO TRUST FUND AND THE UXO LAO MINE ACTION PROGRAMME:  
 
MISSION REPORT 
 
2. Introduction, aim and methodology 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Lao PDR is one of the world's most heavily UXO contaminated nations. 
During the Indo-China war, there was extensive aerial bombardment and 
ground battles. During the period 1964 – 73, more than 500,000 bombing 
missions were launched, dropping more than 2 million tons of ordnance. The 
bombing was concentrated in the northern and southeastern provinces of the 
country. 
 
With support from the international community a national programme, UXO 
LAO, was established in 1995/96. By Prime Ministerial Decree dated 13 
February 1996, a Steering Committee, supervised by the Minister and under 
the Chairmanship of the Vice Minister for Labour and Social Welfare, was 
established and charged with responsibility for overall policy on UXO and 
mine action.  Under the same decree, UXO LAO was established as a public 
institution with legal individual responsibility supervised by the Steering 
Committee. The UXO LAO program is nationally executed. Operational 
activities occur in nine of the most heavily contaminated and impacted 
provinces, covering mine risk reduction education, survey, clearance and 
training. Until recently, UXO LAO employed 1,100 staff, making it one of the 
country’s largest employers.   
 
The UXO LAO program is currently in a financial crisis and although field operations 
are progressing well, the program, as of mid July 2002 has had to reduce the numbers 
of teams working in the field. As a result of this crisis, UNDP and UXO LAO 
undertook to engage an independent assessment mission to clarify the problem and 
provide some insight into possible solutions. 
 
2.2. Aim 
 
This assessment mission was tasked with finding a new funding model for UXO LAO 
to operate at optimum and sustainable levels.  
 
2.3. Methodology 
 
The UNDP Country Office assembled a 4–person team to carry out this Mission. The 
team leader was selected based on extensive experience with humanitarian mine 
DRAFT 
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action programs, with one other expatriate selected for a broad width of experience 
with a number of public and private sector institutions. However, the team was also 
given a strong Lao national component, with one member provided by UXO LAO and 
another provided by the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. The two Lao 
nationals played a vital part in providing the background to the current situation and 
guidance on the structure and working practices of programs in Lao PDR and of the 
Government of Lao. The mission could not have operated without their important 
contributions. 
 
The team was given 3 weeks to complete the mission. Once the team was assembled 
in Vientiane, an outline works plan for the mission was drawn up in consultation with 
UNDP. This broke down activity into the following steps: 
 
• Information gathering, including2 
 
o Briefings from UXO LAO staff and technical advisors on the organisation 
and structure of the UXO LAO program 
 
o Extensive stakeholder consultation drawing on interviews with relevant 
donor, international organisation and NGO representatives 
 
o Meetings with relevant government officials 
 
o Document review and analysis 
 
o Field trips3 
 
• Analysis of the compiled information 
 
• Preparation of briefing material on initial findings, which provided a means to get 
some initial feedback on the final days of the mission.  
 
The process was intense, given the intent of the team to make the process as 
inclusive as possible and the short timeframe of the mission. Not everyone 
that the team hoped to speak to was available (for example, not all donors 
had representatives in country at the time of the mission), but it is believed 
that sufficient input was gained to paint an accurate picture of the situation.  
 
Whatever success has been achieved is due in a very great extent to the 
assistance provided by all of the agencies that the team dealt with. Everyone 
                                                
2
 A summary of meetings is included at Annex A, with a key document list at Annex B. 
3
 The team was required by the Terms of Reference (compiled by UNDP) to undertake at least one field 
trip. In fact, thanks to the extensive cooperation of UXO LAO staff, the team was able to visit two field 
locations, in Xieng Khouang and Khammoune.  
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was very helpful in setting up appointments at short notice and without the 
administrative support from the staff of the UXO LAO and UNDP offices the 
team’s work would have been much harder. 
 
Annexes (not available): 
 
A. Summary of meetings 
B. Key document list 
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3. Background and institutional analysis  
 
3.1. UXO Contamination in Lao PDR 
 
Lao PDR is one of the world's most heavily UXO contaminated nations. During the Indo-
China war period, there was extensive aerial bombardment and ground battles. Briefing 
material prepared by UXO LAO states that, during the period 1964 – 73, more than 
500,000 bombing missions were launched against targets in Laotian territory, dropping 
more than 2 million tons of ordnance. The bombing was concentrated in the northern and 
south-eastern provinces of the country. 
 
As a consequence of this bombing, two-thirds of the country suffers from UXO. Ten of the 
eighteen provinces are considered severely contaminated.4 The Handicap International (HI) 
survey conducted in 1997 found that fifteen of the country’s eighteen provinces were 
affected to one degree or another. HI found that in 42 of the districts surveyed, more than 
35% of the villages reported UXO contamination. These 42 districts the survey considered 
to be ‘severely’ contaminated. Only provinces in the north central part of the country and 
in the west central part of the country, bordering on Myanmar, Thailand and China are 
relatively uncontaminated or not contaminated at all. HI also ranked ten of the country’s 
eighteen provinces as severely contaminated, three provinces as not reporting a significant 
problem at all, and the remaining five provinces reporting significant contamination. 
 
The HI survey found that 2,861 villages of 7,675 villages visited reported the continued 
presence of UXO. Of these villages, 948 reported that UXO lay in the centre of the village, 
posing a threat to the local people and their children. In 375 villages, UXO were reported 
along roads or paths, affecting travel, commerce and access to water, firewood, fodder and 
fields. 1700 villages reported UXO in their fields; these UXO pose risks to the farmers and 
reduce the chances of prosperity. 
 
From analysis of bombing mission records and surveys, it is estimated [by UXO LAO] that 
approximately 87,213 square kilometres of land are considered to have a risk of containing 
UXO.  (12,427 sq. km. high risk, 74,786 sq. km. moderate risk). Through necessity, many 
communities have to live with UXO, which pose both an ongoing humanitarian and 
development challenge.   
 
Most of the aerial bombardment consisted of anti-personnel cluster bombs filled 
with sub-munitions. These…were intended to explode on, or shortly after impact. 
Each cluster bomb container was filled with up to 670 individual bomblets, each 
about the size of a tennis ball. Known as  "bombies" in Lao language, on 
detonation, each one can kill and injure people in the vicinity. Extensive ground 
battles also left a large amount of unexploded ordnance including artillery and 
mortar shells, mines, rockets, grenades, and other devices from various countries 
                                                
4
 Deadly Harvest: Unexploded Ordnance in Laos, a publication of UXO LAO. 
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of origin.  It is estimated [by UXO LAO] that up to 30% of bombies and other 
munitions failed to explode and continue to lie active in the ground5. 
According to the HI survey: 
“This type of UXO [bombies] was found in 1,553 villages. Large 
bombs, varying from 100 kilograms up to 1,000 kilograms were 
recorded as being present in 1,156 villages. Mortar shells were 
reported in 782 villages. Projectiles from artillery and armoured 
vehicles were reported in 555 villages.6” 
The HI survey also accumulated data on nearly 10,649 UXO related 
incidents in Lao PDR since 1973. In 1997 the incidents were occurring 
at a rate of 200 a year. This was a dramatic reduction in the number of 
accidents per year from a reported high of 1400 per year (about 116 
per month on average). UXO LAO briefing notes say that, from the end 
of the war until the mid 1990s, an estimated 240 persons per year 
were victims of UXO and mines. Since that time the number has 
dropped to approximately 100-150 per year but there is apparently 
there is some doubt about the accuracy of reporting. 
 
The HI survey reported that one quarter of total reported incidents involved 
children, and that the proportion of children involved had increased over time. The 
survey also noted that though accidents were occurring during agricultural 
activities or economic activities in the surrounding forests, some villagers 
tampering with the pieces of UXO in order to extract the explosives or to sell the 
scrap metal often cause the items to explode. 
 
UXO injuries in Lao PDR can be compared to injuries sustained in mine-
contaminated countries. Injuries due to mines are often likely to be sustained in 
the lower body, often involving the amputation of the foot or the foot and part of the 
leg. Injuries to the upper body are very rare, and are most likely to occur if the 
mine is being tampered with. If medical care is available fairly quickly, mine victims 
are not so likely to die, unless they are very young children, or very old. In 
contrast, injuries from the “bombies”, or the anti-personnel bomblets dropped by 
the Americans during the Indo-China war are much more likely to kill the person 
involved in the incident. Further, the injuries are much more likely to be to the 
upper body than to the legs. The reason for this, according to Hi is that: 
 
“These devices were designed to kill. More than half of the victims die 
almost immediately following the accident. If the victim survives, the 
                                                
5
 Note: there are a variety of figures in use in the mine action sector to estimate the percentage of 
items of ammunition that fail to function as intended (i.e. that become UXO). Whatever the actual 
percentage actually is, it is certainly true to say that a significant percentage of explosive ordnance 
fails to function. In many respects it does not matter how many items of UXO contaminate an area, 
if the threat of contamination is enough to prevent people from using the ground through fear of 
death or injury. 
6
 Living with UXO, op cit, page 7. 
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explosion often causes severe wounding and trauma, especially to the 
upper half of the body. Over half of the amputations resulting from injuries 
caused by UXO involve amputation of the hand, lower and upper arm. This 
concentration of wounding is due to the position and activity of the victim at 
the time of the accident. Most people are injured while defusing or handling 
UXO, playing with UXO or weeding in agricultural fields.”7 
 
The HI survey noted that the widespread distribution of UXO was an impediment 
to development, and suggested that as population increased there would be 
increased pressure on land, and it “will be difficult for development in affected 
areas and certain sectors of the Lao economy to achieve their full potential.”8 The 
surveyors were unable to place an economic cost on the contamination. 
 
According to UNDP:  
 
“In rural communities, high levels of poverty are often linked to high levels 
of UXO contamination. The widespread presence of UXO prevents the 
majority of the country’s farmers from making full use of existing cultivated 
land and limits expansion of new agricultural activities. Given the country's 
rapid population growth of 3.4 per cent per year, UXO contamination both 
acts as a major constraint to development and contributes to endemic 
poverty by limiting expansion of agricultural production. Low population 
density (lowest in Asia) means that in some areas, communities can choose 
to leave contaminated land alone. However, population growth (highest in 
Asia) is placing pressure on unused (contaminated) land changing the 
national accident profile and the impact on development.9” 
 
3.2. The Establishment of UXO LAO 
 
UXO LAO was established in 1996 by the decree of the Prime Minister. The years 
1996 and 1997 are considered by UXO LAO to have been emergency start-up 
years, and 1998 was the year in which full expansion was achieved and the 
program began to consolidate the gains that it had achieved. According the UXO 
LAO 1998 Annual Report: 
 
“UXO LAO commenced the year with full operations being carried out in four 
provinces. By the end of the year operations had been firmly established and effective in 
eight provinces with preparations well underway for full range of operational activities 
in the ninth province of Khammouane”. 
 
This meant that of the ten most contaminated provinces in Lao PDR, UXO LAO 
was operating in nine. By the end of 1998, UXO LAO could report that it had 
accomplished 1,392 village visits, cleared 292 hectares, destroyed 62,875 pieces 
of UXO, conducted 556 village visits for community awareness, and briefed 
                                                
7
 Living with UXO, op cit, page 8. 
8
 Living with UXO, op cit, page 10. 
9
 Extracted from background material included by UNDP in the terms of reference for this mission. 
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161,456 persons.10 In 1998, UXO LAO employed over 900 deminers, surveyors, 
community awareness staff and trainers.  
 
The objectives of UXO LAO are to: 
 
• Reduce the number of civilian UXO casualties (deaths and injuries). 
 
• Increase the amount of land available for food production and other 
development activities11. 
 
The UXO LAO programme is nationally executed. Operational activities occur in 
nine of the most heavily contaminated and impacted provinces, covering mine risk 
reduction education, survey, clearance and training. Until recently, UXO LAO 
employed 1,100 staff, making it one of the country’s largest employers.   
UXO LAO is responsible for most of the humanitarian12 mine action in Laos, and is 
active in 9 of the 15 affected provinces. Elements of UXO LAO are funded through 
a UNDP - managed Trust Fund, with other contribution being provided bilaterally 
(i.e. not through UNDP).  In some provinces, the work is carried out with the 
assistance of the international organisations (NGO and commercial) that act as 
'implementing partners': 
 
• Mines Advisory Group (UK) 
• Handicap International (Belgium) 
• Belgian Army 
• Gerbera (Germany) 
• Norwegian People’s Aid 
• UNICEF (community awareness programme) 
 
The implementing partners have transferred national staff and have handed over 
equipment and vehicles to UXO LAO and are expected to withdraw completely 
over the next few years (although there is as yet no strategic plan for such a 
withdrawal).  
 
Until earlier this year, UXO LAO deployed 24 demining groups, each consisting of 
52 people and each Group being able to divide into different sized teams able to 
work on three sites simultaneously. The teams carry out both area clearance tasks 
(where the teams work to clear an entire site of contamination) and roving 
clearance tasks (where the team responds to reports of isolated UXO being found 
and clears them).  The roving teams normally consist of a team leader, 4-5 
deminers and a medic, whereas area clearance tasks can take up to all 35 people 
in the group. UXO LAO is also deploying survey teams to follow up on the National 
Survey carried out by Handicap International in 1997, and is actively involved in 
community awareness programs implemented by UNICEF. 
                                                
10
 UXO LAO: 1998 Annual Report, Lao National UXO Programme. 
11
 UXO LAO: Laos National UXO Programme 1999 Work Plan, page 1. 
12
 The use of the word ‘humanitarian’ in this context can be confusing. In terms of UXO LAO activity 
‘humanitarian’ does not include most development sectors and is used to describe ‘emergency’ 
clearance of reported UXO and area clearance of agricultural land that is not covered out on a 
cost-recovery basis. The question of how to define ‘humanitarian’ UXO clearance will be addressed 
in more depth in later sections of this report. 
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3.3. UNDP and the UXO LAO Trust Fund 
 
UNDP agreed a Project Document with the government of Lao PDR in November 
1995, giving them a role to assist in the clearance of UXO through the 
establishment and operation of a trust fund for mine action activities in Lao PDR. 
Although often referred to as the “UXO LAO Trust Fund” an exact interpretation of 
the documentation makes it clear that the trust fund could be used to support mine 
action activities by any approved actors, and its mandate covers community 
awareness (called ‘Mine Risk Education’ in other country programs) and victim 
assistance. UNDP have also assisted in the provision of some technical advisors 
to UXO LAO. 
 
3.4. The National Steering Committee 
 
The establishment of the Lao UXO Trust Fund was mirrored by the establishment 
of a National Steering Committee to provide Lao PDR government oversight of the 
national UXO program. The Minister of Labour and Social Welfare is the Chair of 
the National Steering Committee. Initially, UXO LAO also acted as a secretariat to 
this committee until 2000, when a new Prime Ministerial Decree relieved the 
National Director of UXO LAO from his duties as Secretary of the National 
Steering Committee and gave this duty to a new National Steering Committee 
Office (NSCO). The decree also gives NSCO responsibility for a wide number of 
tasks, including coordination and development of fund raising strategies; however 
the NSCO is not yet fully effective in such a role, not least as a result of a lack of 
any external funding or technical assistance.  
 
3.5. Resource mobilisation 
 
There is no doubt that UXO LAO has implemented its program of training and 
clearance activities with remarkable success. A review of the organisation’s 
Annual Reports for the years 1996 to 2001 demonstrate its achievements.   
 
In 1996, the organisation’s corporate structure was established as an autonomous 
financial agency, office facilities and a Steering Committee were set up, a training 
centre was established, community awareness activities began, a survey of 
affected provinces was undertaken, and clearance teams began work in four 
provinces.  
 
The following year five additional target provinces were included in the program, 
additional staff were recruited and training continued.  Resource mobilisation 
activities were also successful and UXO clearance was raised at the 
Government/UNDP Round Table Meeting for donors.   
 
Between 1998 and 2000 the program of clearance, awareness and training was 
extended and economic modelling was undertaken to assess the productive value 
of cleared land.  Most of the targets identified in annual work plans were met, 
Assessment mission of the Lao UXO Trust Fund and the UXO LAO Mine Action Programme DRAFT 
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although problems were noted in recruiting or training maintenance staff and in 
resource mobilisation.   
 
A number of operations were streamlined in 2000 including centralisation of 
purchasing and staffing, and changes were made to the National Steering 
Committee.  The financial basis of UXO activities in Lao received relatively little 
attention in the early years of operation.  One of the benefits of using a Trust Fund 
is that funds can be carried over from one financial year into the next. By contrast, 
many donors are obliged to return unused funds to their respective government or 
agency at the end of each financial year and some donors contributed unused 
humanitarian or emergency funds to the Trust Fund as their financial year closed.   
 
The following table summarises income, expenditure and carryover for the period 
1996 to 2001. Limitations of the data are that separate figures for 1996 and 1997 
are not available and that one major contribution expected in 1998 was not 
received until the following financial year.   
 
Table 3.1: Selected financial information on Trust Fund operations13 
Year Ser Description 
1996-1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
1 Subtotal un-
earmarked 
     2,395,104    1,314,071      1,111,647   1,389,405     1,381,405 
2 Subtotal earmarked      1,972,357    1,326,361      3,389,869        74,309     1,355,930 
3 Total income      6,487,461    2,640,432      4,625,901   2,076,807     3,373,131 
4 National staff        218,797        856,349   1,376,279     1,631,180 
5 International staff        296,134        267,164      347,426        398,100 
6 Other 2,524,582 4,210,000 1,589,513 1,875,176 2,060,067 
7 Total expenditure 2529060 4720898 2713799 3598881 4089348 
8 Total Carryover 3958401 1877935 3790037 2267963 1551746 
 
The key feature of the table is that contributions, especially for un-earmarked 
activities have gradually fallen.  By contrast, costs, especially for national salaries 
have risen steadily over the period.  By the end of the period much of the 
carryover funding was earmarked to projects and was not available for other 
activities, especially staff salaries.  Further financial information is at Annexes A-D.  
 
UXO LAO Annual Reports also record in kind contributions in excess of $5m each 
year since 1998.  This includes additional support for training, equipment, vehicles 
and materials, as well as bilateral agreements with implementing partners.  These 
contributions are not placed directly into the Trust Fund, however, up to $10m per 
year might be attributed to mine action in Lao PDR.  This estimate does not 
include the activities of private companies that undertake commercial demining for 
infrastructure and other investment14.   
                                                
13
 Provided by UXO LAO  
14
 The low emphasis made on non Trust Fund contributions is understandable in that these 
contributions are outside the scope of the Trust Fund, but make it harder for contributors to 
measure all inputs against outputs. It would certainly help if the total contributions were made 
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The initial UNDP contributions of over $2 million set a strong financial basis for 
activities, and work commenced quickly to establish a training facility and field 
operations.   
 
In 1996 resource mobilisation efforts were successful in raising the necessary 
funds for operations.  Efforts to secure funding in the longer term were rewarded 
by a number of donors.   
 
In 1997 and 1998 UNDP remained the focal point for resource mobilisation 
activities. Contributions to the work of UXO LAO were received through the Trust 
Fund, bilateral contributions, contributions paid directly to implementing partner 
organisation and private donations. In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
assisted in liaison with donor countries and organisations.  
 
In 1999 initial UNDP start-up funds were fully expended.  Concern was raised that, 
while direct funding from donors for international staff continued, funding for 
national staff (deminers, trainers, surveyors, etc) and programme running costs 
was reducing. UXO LAO’s forward estimates revealed a gap in future funding from 
2000 onwards.   
 
This concern was realised the following year when UXO LAO assumed 
responsibility for national salaries and operating costs.  National personnel 
previously employed by implementing partners NGOs were gradually transferred 
to UXO LAO contracts and assets were handed over.  
 
The UXO LAO Annual Report for 2001 reported: 
 
“Securing the necessary funds to make UXO LAO’s humanitarian and development 
work viable continued to be a difficult task in 2001.  As a result of the increased 
expenditure in UXO LAO’s financial responsibilities for national salaries and operating 
costs, and a decrease in donor support to the programme, UXO LAO was only just able 
to continue full operations in 2001.  The increased expenditure of UXO LAO was a 
direct result of national personnel previously employed and funded by our 
implementing partners being transferred to UXO LAO contracts as well as some assets 
and the costs associated with those assets being handed over to the national body (UXO 
LAO).  While implementing partner and direct donor funding to the partners was 
reduced, as a result of the hand over, a similar increase in contributions to UXO LAO 
did not occur. 
                                                                                                                                              
clearer. The recommendations for structural changes discussed later in this report would help 
rectify this situation. 
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…In previous years UXO LAO has been able to carry over substantial funds 
from year to year to be able to provide new funding while the programme 
continued at full operations”. 
  
Several attempts were made to address this issue as it unfolded. An External 
Evaluation Mission15 conducted in 1998 to consider the difficulties to be addressed 
in moving from the establishment to consolidation phase of the project.  Issues 
identified in the report were presented in four key areas: the need for strategic as 
well as operational planning, capacity building, the importance of efficient 
procurement and management and the need to strengthen resource mobilisation 
efforts.   
 
In 2000, the USA funded a study into sustainable funding mechanisms by BAHR16.  
The report outlined four options and recommended that an interest-bearing fund 
be established from donations and grants with a 20-year life to provide $5 million 
per year.  There are a number of practical implications of this approach and, to 
date, no attempt has been made to implement the option.   
 
In spite of these efforts resource mobilisation for UXO LAO was not adequate and 
the organisation proved to be financially unsustainable.  In 2002 UXO LAO 
employed 1,130 staff but by the end of July the number had been cut to 623. Many 
reasons have been given for this including donor fatigue, competition for 
humanitarian assistance from widely reported activity in other countries such as 
Afghanistan, a level of complacency as UXO LAO focussed on operational issues 
rather than funding and a lack of planning.  There is also no doubt that the 
decision to transfer Lao national staff to UXO LAO, rather than continuing their 
employment directly through NGOs, was a significant factor.  This issue is 
discussed in more detail later in this report. 
 
There are a number of implications of this financial shortfall. Firstly, training and 
equipment will be unused and the investment it represents could be lost. Many of 
the people who have been retrenched are deminers who live in provinces where 
there are few employment alternatives. In addition to the effect on provincial 
economies, there is a risk that deminers may be tempted to use their skills to 
harvest UXO for scrap metal, for the explosive they contain or to sell the casing as 
souvenirs to tourists. A further complication is that life expectancy in Lao PDR is 
54 years and people who witnessed the bombings and can assist with descriptions 
of the activity are relatively old.  Other staff, that have transferable skills, such as 
translators, secretaries or drivers will take jobs in other organisations. 
 
 
Annexes to Section 3: 
 
A. UXO LAO Income, 1996-2001 
B. UXO LAO Expenditure, 1996-2001 
C. Balances Brought Forward, 1996-2001 
D. Summary of Expenditure Breakdown for UXO LAO, 1996-2001
                                                
15
 Van Ree, Taylor and Chanthavilay External Evaluation Mission Project Lao/95/012/C/07/99 
16
 Business of Adams, Hargett and Riley: Lao PDR Feasibility Study on Reimbursable UXO 
Clearance 
Assessment mission of the Lao UXO Trust Fund and the UXO LAO Mine Action Programme 
  
 14 DRAFT 
4. The Issues 
A wide range of issues and concerns was raised with the evaluation team. 
The main headings under which the issues could be grouped are as follows: 
 
• Coordination 
• Planning 
• Gaps in the UXO Program 
• Regulatory and implementation roles of UXO LAO 
• Trust Fund Management and the role of UNDP 
• Transparency and accountability 
• Importance of the UXO issue within Government of Lao policy 
• Reluctance or inability of donors to provide funds for national salaries 
• Public Relations and Resource Mobilisation 
 
4.1 Coordination 
 
Many donors expressed concern about a perceived lack of coordination of 
UXO activity in Lao PDR.  In addition to UXO LAO, there are a number of 
commercial projects and the Lao army who are involved in demining activity. 
The early focus of UXO LAO was on training and demining and less attention 
was given to the coordination role defined in its charter, although some high 
quality coordination tools have been developed, such as the database.   
 
There is also confusion about which agency leads UXO clearance activity in 
Lao PDR. Some donors liase with UXO LAO but also note that the Steering 
Committee Secretariat has approached donors directly.  Many donors would 
like to see more structured coordination without setting up a large 
bureaucratic structure.  
 
4.2 Planning 
 
All donors expressed concern that the disposal of UXO in Lao PDR appears 
to be an open ended activity and that there has been no real attempt to define 
the level of resources needed to control or remove the problem. UXO LAO 
produces annual reports giving figures for the numbers of hectares cleared, 
number and types of UXO destroyed, number of villages visited by awareness 
teams and the number of beneficiaries in each village.  Donors recognise, 
however, that these numbers only tell part of the story.  No two sites are the 
same and it is difficult to determine from the figures whether demining in Lao 
As stated at the beginning of this report, UXO LAO has made significant 
progress in addressing the UXO problem in Lao PDR.  By focussing on 
financial sustainability, this report does not fully cover the many positive 
achievements to date. It is recognised that a significant amount of capacity 
building has been carried out and teams are clearing bombs throughout 9 
provinces without incident on a daily basis.  
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PDR is a cost effective exercise. Other issues also compete for development 
assistance.  One example often cited is that there are far more people killed in 
road accidents in Lao than by UXO and some donors have reallocated 
resources to improving roads and raising traffic safety awareness. This 
approach overlooks the economic benefit of cleared land for food production 
in a country where it is estimated that over half the population suffers from 
episodic or chronic malnutrition.  Although some work has been undertaken to 
estimate the economic and social cost of contamination these benefits are not 
widely reported. 
 
Estimates of the time it might take to clear UXO in Lao have ranged up to 
1300 years whereas donors carefully plan their activities for between one and 
five years in advance.  No donor is prepared to fund an open-ended 
commitment.  
 
The process of clearing UXO is time consuming and cannot be rushed, 
however, it is not possible or necessary to clear every piece of UXO in the 
country. The development of a strategic plan, identifying areas of land that 
have economic potential, offers a direction forward.   
 
Development assistance requires a structured approach. A strategic plan, with 
estimates of the project’s scope including time and resources required to bring 
the problem under control, and a framework of socio-economic milestones 
and outputs, would provide a focal point for donor support.   
 
Funding for development assistance is usually allocated after consideration of 
priorities across all sectors and in consultation with the Lao Government.  
Donors need several years of lead time to plan and are likely to support a 
strategic plan that has been endorsed by the Government at the highest level. 
 
The planning process could also justify increased external funding for a 
clearly defined time period.   
 
4.3 Gaps in the UXO program 
 
A number of gaps in UXO activity were also raised that could be addressed in 
a plan:  
 
• Some contaminated provinces still do not have demining projects. 
 
• The socio-economic benefits of demining have could be more clearly 
identified and measured.  There is an opportunity cost of unproductive 
land and a high social and economic cost in supporting victims.   
 
• No single agency appears to be responsible for collating and disseminating information 
on the number of UXO related accidents although some data is collected by Consortium 
as part of its awareness campaign. 
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• Commercial deminers are not required to provide data on areas they have 
cleared to update the national database. 
 
• Community awareness programs target some villagers and schools, but 
no agency is directly targeting information towards people who defuse 
bombs for scrap (usually adult males). 
 
 
4.4 Regulatory and Implementation roles of UXO LAO 
 
Demining activities in Lao PDR are self regulated and it is possible that 
different standards are being used by agencies outside the UXO framework. 
Most donors agree that the same standards should apply to all operations, 
regardless of which agency undertook the work and whether the activity was 
for humanitarian, development or commercial outcomes17.    
 
One issue that was raised by stakeholders is that UXO LAO operations could 
be more efficient and devote more time and resources to improved 
coordination. For example, the current centralised decision making process 
delays expenditure being approved, even where that expenditure is 
specifically agreed and budgeted for within individual project MOU.  
 
4.5 Trust Fund Management and the Role of UNDP  
 
UNDP oversees use of the Trust Fund and some donors would like the 
agency to take a stronger role in donor coordination. 
 
Some concern was expressed that UNDP administrative processes and 
contract requirements are slow, although the situation has improved in recent 
years. The time taken for administrative processes has not met the financial 
and reporting requirements of some donors.   
 
The Trust Fund tracks funds as either earmarked or unearmarked 
contributions.  Earmarked funds are provided with an identified purpose 
(normally as required by the donor) while unearmarked funds are used to 
support other community awareness and demining activities.  Some donors 
have chosen to work bilaterally to gain more visibility for and to ensure closer 
responsibility for a project. Bilateral agreements also allow donors to work 
through NGOs registered in their own countries.  Bilateral funding is not fully 
reported in existing UXO LAO reporting documentation, which can make it 
difficult to assess the full expenditure on UXO projects in Lao PDR. There is 
no recording of development projects funded through the Asian Development 
Bank, for example, even though this is a significant amount when compared 
to money put through the UNDP Trust Fund. 
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 The establishment of an independent agency with professionally trained individuals to 
monitor activity and ensure that national standards are developed and met would provide 
quality assurance to donors and engender community support. This idea is developed later in 
the report. 
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There also appears to be duplication in the duties of the Trust Fund Manager 
at UNDP and the international advisers responsible for financial and project 
administration who work within the UXO LAO organisation. One example is 
that there are two sets of financial records for managing the Trust Fund, one 
managed by UXO LAO and the other by UNDP.   
 
UNDP has recognised these concerns and is prepared to take an enhanced 
role, for example by assisting with policy development, resource mobilisation, 
advocacy and donor coordination.  It is also in the process of reviewing staff 
duties to ensure that positions compliment and do not duplicate others and 
that funds are managed in a timely and efficient manner.  It would also be 
possible to accommodate concerns about visibility and use of national NGOs 
using earmarked funds. Furthermore, if there was a more developed planning 
process there should actually be little requirement for ‘unearmarked’ funds. 
 
4.6 Transparency and accountability 
 
Another limitation of the current Trust Fund management structure is that it 
only tracks cash through invoices. While this invoice system appears to be 
working well, there is, at present, apparently no way to directly connect cash 
in with inventory control or procurement. This has significant implications to 
observation of transparency and accountability.  It is recommended that an 
accrual based accounting system be implemented to address these limitations 
and to provide more accurate and transparent reporting.   
 
There is a need to reform this aspect of the program, not least to prevent the 
program from being vulnerable to possible accusations of impropriety in the 
future. The recommendations for planning and options for organisational 
change set out later in this report would provide solutions to this problem. 
 
Recommendation: that an accrual based accounting system be 
introduced. 
 
4.7 Importance of the UXO issue within Government of Lao 
policy 
 
Given the high level of UXO contamination in Lao PDR, and its links to 
poverty, some donors expressed concern that the government does not 
appear to rate clearance as one of its highest priorities.  
 
This view is supported by the fact that the government is not a signatory to the 
Ottawa Treaty, that UXO issues have attracted relatively little attention in the 
government’s most important planning forum, the Round Table Process, that 
the UXO LAO organisation reports through the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Welfare which is regarded as a junior portfolio, and that there is no visible 
coordination or policy unit. Donors raised concern that the Steering 
Committee does not meet regularly and appears not to have much direct 
ownership of UXO clearance activities in Lao PDR.   
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However, the Government is considering the Ottawa Treaty.  Although there 
are no plans to accede to the Treaty in the near future, Lao PDR is not 
believed to be a producer or exporter of antipersonnel mines.18  More could 
be done to emphasise these positive points. In addition, there is an 
opportunity to place UXO on the agenda at future Round Table meetings.   
 
The Lao Government is addressing many challenges in its efforts to raise Lao 
from the list of Least Developed Countries by 2020.  For example, it is 
developing infrastructure, improving agricultural practices, building schools, 
training teachers and developing curricula, providing health services and 
addressing many other priorities. The government is obliged to make 
decisions about how it uses its scarce resources and is unable to contribute 
directly to UXO clearance at this time.  It estimates its in-kind contribution to 
UXO LAO at $200,000 per year.    
 
It appears that the implications of administrative changes to UXO LAO 
introduced in 2000 were not thoroughly assessed.  In addition to taking on 
management responsibility for staffing and logistics, the representation on the 
Steering Committee was upgraded to Ministerial, rather than Vice Ministerial 
leadership.  One consequence of the change has been that, although the 
profile of the Committee was raised, it has met less frequently as new 
Steering Committee members from more senior government ranks have even 
more demands on their time than the previous membership.   
 
There appears to be a consensus from both donors and government that 
coordination and planning can be constructively addressed and this is 
discussed in a later section of this report.   
 
Two other significant issues are associated with Lao government involvement 
in the UXO program.  First, demining activities often involve foreign nationals, 
many with military training.  These advisers may carry explosives in vehicles 
around provincial areas.  Quite reasonably the government must be satisfied 
that appropriate security, safety standards and awareness are being met. The 
second issue is that UXO LAO personnel are employed under a different 
contract arrangement to government officials and receive higher salaries.  
This has created tension between UXO LAO and other government agencies.   
 
4.8 Reluctance or inability of donors to provide funds for 
national salaries 
 
As discussed in Section 3, donor funds did not automatically follow the 
transfer of Lao staff from NGOs to UXO LAO and centralisation of operations 
in 2000.  
 
There are a number of reasons for this.  Some donors have explicit policies 
that recurrent recipient government costs should not be met by development 
assistance funds.  Although some exceptions have been made for Lao PDR, 
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 International Campaign to Ban Land Mines Landmine Monitor Report 2000.  
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most aid is conditional on the recipient government meeting the costs of staff 
salaries.   
 
Prior to changes in administrative arrangements whereby staff contracts were 
transferred from NGOs to UXO LAO, deminers were paid $150 per month.  As 
a result of the change, and in recognition that government salaries are 
considerably lower than those received by deminers, the salary was reduced 
to $115. Approximately sixty staff left the project, a mix of field and office staff.  
 
The transfer appeared desirable to streamline procedures and maximise cost 
efficiency in purchasing.  Many donors also supported the change as a step 
towards institutionalisation. Concern was raised, however, that payment of 
salaries would be unsustainable for the Lao Government.  
 
4.9 Public Relations and Resource Mobilisation 
 
Funding for humanitarian purposes is never guaranteed, even for well-
formulated proposals. The situation in Laos has attracted very little attention 
recently, whereas other countries, such as Afghanistan, have drawn 
considerable media attention. 
 
A number of suggestions were made to improve fundraising efforts. These are 
set out in more detail in a later section. 
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5. UXO Contamination: Defining the problem 
 
5.1 Recognising the limits of aid 
 
Two million tons of bombs spread over millions of hectares. One estimate shared 
with the team was that it would take 1300 years to search every square metre of 
potentially contaminated ground. It is clear that UXO LAO is not going to maintain 
donor interest for such a long period of time! 
 
On the other hand, people in Europe are still killed by explosives left over from the 
First World War, so it is entirely likely that the UXO contamination in Lao PDR will 
continue to pose a threat for the next century. Nevertheless, it is still unlikely that 
donors could commit to a program of such a length. 
 
As discussed in the ‘issues’ section of this report, the lack of a comprehensive 
strategic plan is a major concern of donors. Furthermore, feedback from 
stakeholders indicates that, to be effective and comprehensive the plan must 
cover all elements of mine action, not just clearance.  
 
There is therefore a need to prioritise clearance activity so that the key areas of 
need can be addressed in the ‘window’ of funding that is available from donors19. 
This suggests that there will need to be a sustainable capacity that will deal with 
the UXO problem after donor funds have ceased flowing.  
 
In turn, this logic suggests that there needs to be three phases: 
 
• A short-term plan to reconfigure current structures to produce a ‘best fit’ for 
meeting the requirements of a strategic plan 
 
• A ‘surge’ capacity to deal with priority land in the medium term, supported by 
international funding 
 
• Nationally funded operation, without any international assistance, of a capacity 
to deal with UXO contamination in the long term 
 
Some of the key points that could be covered in each of these phases are set out 
below.  These are not absolutes; they are a basis for discussion that can assist 
stakeholders to determine an agreed strategic approach. Note that, for the 
purposes of defining a strategic approach to the overall problem, it is useful to 
identify the long-term goals first. This provides the basis for developing a ‘train and 
equip’ program that will be necessary to put in place the capacity necessary to 
achieve the long-term goals. 
                                                
19
 There are precedents for not clearing every bomb and mine. For example, in the Falkland 
Islands, minefields containing approximately 35,000 antipersonnel mines were left in clearly fenced 
and marked areas, because they contaminate land of no socio-economic value, pose no threat to 
the local population and would be too hazardous and too expensive to clear. The mine action 
program in the Falklands was thus limited to cover community awareness, minefield marking and 
provision of roving teams to deal with UXO found outside marked areas. 
Assessment mission of the Lao UXO Trust Fund and the UXO LAO Mine Action Programme DRAFT 
 21 DRAFT 
5.2 Long-term planning: designing a sustainable capacity 
 
This section concentrates on what should be left behind after international 
assistance ceases. Of course, many of the elements necessary to create a 
sustainable UXO capacity already exist in UXO LAO, and subsequent 
development work should concentrate on filling the gaps.  
 
5.2.1 UXO Clearance 
 
A sustainable UXO clearance capacity to operate in the long term could be 
designed around the following parameters: 
 
• The focus of developing a sustainable capacity could be based on the current 
primary objective of UXO LAO, i.e. to reduce the risk of death or injury from 
UXO. To this end, this could involve deployment of roving teams in each 
province where there is a problem with UXO contamination to deal with 
reported UXO. While there should be a presence in each contaminated 
province the size of the presence (i.e. the number of teams) should be 
proportionate to the size and impact of the problem. A list of factors that could 
be taken into account in the weighting process include: 
 
o The size of the province (which has impact on travelling time) 
 
o The geographical extent of the UXO problem (which has impact on the 
likelihood of problems arising) 
 
o The size of the population (which also has an impact on the likelihood of 
problems arising) 
 
• The number of teams could be also based on the number necessary to meet a 
minimum performance target, for example, a requirement to meet a maximum 
allowable delay between the UXO being reported and being dealt with. A 
province could be given sufficient teams to meet a planned response time of 7 
days, based on historical data about numbers of UXO reported per month. 
 
• The distribution of teams, and their efficiency of operation, could also be 
continually monitored and re-evaluated against: 
 
o The number of casualties reported every year 
 
o The number of tasks that each team is able to carry out each month 
 
• One other key criterion in designing a sustainable UXO clearance capacity is 
the fact that this will, in all likelihood, be based on a program that is entirely 
nationally funded and executed.  
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5.2.2 Community Awareness 
 
The community Awareness concept developed by the Ministry of Education in 
collaboration with UNICEF appears to be working well and seems to have the 
potential for true sustainability.   
 
• Ideally, the same approach as currently used by the UNICEF funded project to 
reach children (i.e. using existing organisations to deliver the message, 
reinforced by use of mass media) should be extended to cover all elements of 
the population at risk. 
 
• The community awareness message should include instructions on how items 
of UXO that are discovered should be reported, and to which organisation they 
should be reported. 
 
• There should continue to be coordination of UXO clearance and community 
awareness programs 
 
• There should continue to be technical advice on UXO issues available in order 
to ensure that the messages given out by the community awareness projects 
remain correct. 
 
5.2.3 UXO Database/Archive 
 
The role of the UXO database will continue to be important. Indeed, as time 
progresses, its role as an archive will gain importance. Development projects will 
need the ability to determine whether an area has been cleared and to what depth 
the clearance was undertaken. 
 
It is important that all UXO clearance is recorded in the database.  Currently there 
is no requirement that commercial demining data is recorded although this has 
occurred on a voluntary basis to some extent.  
 
5.2.4 UXO Reporting Mechanism 
 
The development of a responsive UXO clearance program will also depend on the 
availability of a structure to receive reports of UXO and pass them on to the 
clearance teams. This could be something that could be developed using existing 
local resources, such as the local police.  
 
5.2.5 Training Needs Analysis 
 
As part of the planning process, a training needs analysis should be undertaken to 
ensure that the training development requirement is taken account of in the plan. 
The long-term sustainable program will need to ensure that it can train its own staff 
in all necessary skills. Additionally, the long-term plan should also address what 
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should be done for UXO LAO staff laid off at the end of the midterm surge activity. 
This could include a retraining program. 
 
5.3 Medium term planning: clearing priority land 
 
As has already been identified above, international donor assistance is unlikely to 
be available to clear all the land contaminated by UXO in Lao PDR. Therefore, in 
the short term, attention should be focussed on three main targets: 
 
• Developing the roving teams with a view to their being able to meet long term 
goals 
 
• Clearing priority land for development 
 
• Developing the other attributes of a sustainable UXO program 
 
The development of the roving teams, and the other attributes of a sustainable 
program, have already been covered in detail above. This section focuses in more 
detail on possible ways to determine strategic priorities for area clearance. 
 
5.3.1 Determining the extent of the response 
 
Given that there is so much contaminated land to clear and so little resources 
available to undertake clearance, it is imperative that realistic limits are set on the 
UXO clearance program. As one of the priority tasks of UXO LAO is to clear land 
for agricultural development, this has been used as the basis for some broad, 
approximate calculations of the requirement. 
 
One very useful tool for this is the planning document produced with the 
assistance of JICA and published in October 200120. The report is based on 
Government of Lao planning targets to raise Lao PDR out of the group of least 
developed nations by 2020 and sets out the requirement to develop priority areas 
within the 2.1 million hectares of potential agricultural and forestry land within this 
time frame. Therefore, there is a case to be made for developing a strategic plan 
for UXO area clearance that supports this rural development plan. The JICA report 
provides further potential guidance, as the report compares the target land for 
agricultural development with UXO contamination data drawn from the UXO LAO 
database. One of the maps produced in the JICA reports, showing impact of UXO 
contamination on potential lowland rice cultivation is a useful example and is 
included for ease of reference at Annex A. This comparison reveals that of these 
2.1 million hectares of potential target land for rural development, only some 
24,000 hectares is potentially contaminated. We can therefore present a range of 
options for designing a clearance program. These are set out below. 
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 JICA Master Plan Study on Integrated Agricultural Development in Lao PDR dated Oct 2001 
(AFR JR 01 42). We understand that the JICA report has already been adopted for use on an 
informal basis as the development ‘Master Plan’. 
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• Scenario One: Restore to 2001 staffing levels 
 
24,000 hectares is still a great deal of land to be cleared, but as recent 
performance statistics of the UXO LAO program reveal, with an average clearance 
rate of around 700 hectares per year at 2001 staffing levels, the program could 
clear all of the potentially contaminated land that is targeted for rural development 
in just under 33 years if current funding targets were met. An extract of the report, 
showing the maps used, is included below. 
 
JICA Estimates of Priority Areas 
Ser Priority Size (Ha) Remarks 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
1 High Risk21 630  
2 Medium Risk 3,260 
3 Low Risk 19,790  
630 ha appears less than one year’s work at 2001 
figures, though this could depend on the nature of the 
ground to be cleared. 
4 Total 23,680   
 
• Scenario Two: A ten-year target  
 
Clearing all the target land in 33 years would still not meet the Government of Lao 
development target of 2020. In broad terms, if the size of the program could be 
increased to around 3 times its 2001 size, it could clear the priority target areas in 
around 10 years. This would be compatible with the 2020 target for development. 
A 10-year clearance program is also compatible with the requirements of the 
Ottawa Treaty. See the outline works plan below. 
 
• Scenario Three: Current staffing 
 
A third option would be to design a program based on current staffing levels. 
Although there is not yet much data about the effect the staffing reduction has had 
on clearance rates, one can assume, for the purposes of forecasting, that halving 
the staff has halved the clearance rate. If this were true, this clearance rate would 
allow all of the target land set out in the JICA report to be cleared in some 70 
years22. This may also be too long a period to expect continued international 
support; however, as the JICA report does divide the potentially contaminated land 
into high medium and low priorities, so it may be possible to set a strategic target 
that is based on clearing the higher priority areas whilst continuing to deploy roving 
clearance teams that deal with the most important task of reducing risk. 
 
Ideally, the program should be funded to achieve the 10-year target. Although this 
appears the most expensive, perhaps, as it would probably cost more or less the 
same to employ 3000 people for 10 years as it does to employ 1000 people for 30 
                                                
21
 The ‘risk’ is based on advice from the UXO LAO database and is, apparently, a function of how 
near the agricultural land to the nearest contaminated area. The use of risk as one criterion for 
deciding priority of agricultural clearance would tally with the overall priority role of the program, 
which is to reduce casualties. 
22
 This figure is based on the broad assumption that the clearance rate is halved if the staffing 
levels are halved. However, if this lower staff level is maintained it may be appropriate to reduce 
the amount of effort expended on area clearance in order to provide more support to the first 
priority targets: deployment of roving teams to respond to reported UXO that represent the greatest 
threat to public safety. 
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years, there is little actual saving to be made by stretching out the program, 
especially as equipment (another major program cost) would have to be replaced 
several times over the longer period. It should therefore be possible to compare 
the short cost of loading the program ‘up front’ over a 10-year period against the 
opportunity cost of clearing the land more slowly.  The longer it takes to clear the 
land targeted for rural development, the longer it will be before that land can be 
productive. However, there also appear to be a number of ways by which the 
program could be more productive through increased cost effectiveness. Some 
ideas for improving cost effectiveness are included at Annex B. 
 
These scenarios are subject to a number of assumptions.  It is assumed that the 
rate of clearance achieved in by UXO LAO is representative of the national 
problem.  If the extent and type of contamination varies output will vary 
accordingly.  Other factors can potentially affect clearance: it is reasonable to 
assume that the rate will increase as deminers gain more experience of if new 
techniques become available. As mentioned above, these scenarios are based on 
current techniques that do not take account of potential for increasing cost 
effectiveness (see Annex B).  Furthermore, all activity should be subject to regular 
review to ensure that targets are met or modified if necessary.  
 
Recommendation: That a program be developed to clear priority agricultural 
areas in a ten year timeframe (Scenario 2) 
5.3.2 Other development targets 
 
Agricultural development targets are listed in the UXO LAO program 
documentation as being the second priority task (casualty reduction being the first 
priority), and the JICA report provides a means for estimating how big a task this 
might be. However, it is not suggested that only agricultural tasks are carried out 
by UXO LAO. There may be other tasks that are necessary, either in support of 
rural development (such as clearing land for irrigation schemes) or in support of 
the overall economic development of Lao PDR. In the past, many such tasks have 
not been a priority of UXO LAO, for a number of reasons (these are covered in 
more detail in the ‘issues’ section of this report). In principle, there should be no 
reason why the program cannot carry out a task that is in support of an economic 
development project and is, as such, deemed necessary by the relevant 
competent authority. It should be balanced against the opportunity cost of clearing 
agricultural land. In other words, other development projects23 could be supported 
where their net benefit can be demonstrated as being greater than the benefit 
generated by employing the same clearance resources on agricultural land. 
 
There is a separate, though related issue, which is to determine the appropriate 
means of paying for such project-based work. In principle, it may be possible to 
                                                
23
 There is a need for the program to develop clearer guidelines on what constitutes a development 
project. For example, we understand that telecommunications projects would not count as 
development projects because telecommunications projects are themselves profit generating. 
Potential users of demining assets to support such projects should be directed towards commercial 
mine action service providers. On the other hand, work supporting infrastructure projects may be a 
valid use of humanitarian mine action resources.  
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allocate resources to support non-agricultural projects on a cost recovery basis. 
The concept of cost recovery is addressed in a later section of this report. 
 
5.3.3 Developing a strategic action plan 
 
Once the broad 
length of the 
program has been 
decided, and once 
the nature of tasks 
that are eligible for 
inclusion is 
determined, it 
should be possible 
to develop a 
strategic action 
plan. 
 
The plan should 
include a number 
of components 
that, together, 
make up the 
strategic response. 
For example, the 
strategic plan 
could be broken up 
into a number of component areas such as roving clearance, area clearance and 
community awareness. The main components could then be divided up by 
province (or by other subcomponent divisions) and then divided again into a 
number of discrete projects that could then be planned in detail. This subdivision 
process is represented in the diagram at Figure 5/1 above.  The development of 
discrete projects also allows the identification of related activities that, whilst not 
mine action per se, are projects that would connect with the activities of the 
program, such as the development of a museum that would help educate visitors 
to Lao PDR on the subject of UXO contamination and clearance, or the 
development of clinics as an ‘added value’ service provided by the site medics24. 
 
The diagram at Figure 5.1 represents a simplified version; there could be many 
other projects that could be included. For example, one such project could be “the 
design and implementation of community based community awareness program in 
province X intended to target adult males involved in the illegal recovery of scrap 
metal and explosives from UXO”. Another such project might be “the training, 
equipping and operating of roving clearance teams in one of the provinces that 
has not has yet had any UXO clearance support.” Dividing the strategic plan into 
                                                
24
 The question of using site medics to provide external medical services is addressed in slightly 
more detail in Annex B. 
Strategic
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Strategic Action Plan Components
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Training Needs
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Figure 5/1. Possible outline structure of a strategic action plan 
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discrete projects may have benefits in terms of resource mobilisation, which is 
discussed in a later section of this report. 
 
There is also a need to add a timescale to program activity. The works plan that 
follows is an outline of the major activities that could be undertaken in a 10-year 
action plan. As explained above, all of these major activities would in turn have a 
large number of subsidiary tasks that take place within them.  .  
 
The use of a surge capacity means that extra teams would be brought on line at 
the beginning of the medium term, trained and equipped, and then operated with 
international supervision for a short while. Once the teams were effective they 
could then operate with reduced international monitoring until the end of the 
medium term planning process. This reduction could form the basis for planning 
an exit strategy for international assistance. 
 
Recommendation: Develop a Strategic Plan to achieve a ten-year target (this 
is further discussed in Section 7 of this report).   
 
5.3.4 Prioritisation 
 
As identified above, there are not enough resources to tackle all the contamination 
in Lao PDR in the foreseeable future. Therefore the program should take steps to 
develop the methodology to determine priorities for the annual works plan, so that 
the most important areas are cleared first. Furthermore, the prioritisation process 
should be transparent; this will have the added benefit of allowing donors to match 
inputs to outputs and thus help build donor and community confidence. At the 
moment, the lack of clear prioritisation criteria leaves the program potentially open 
to criticism about which land is being cleared. Some notes on possible criteria for 
objective prioritisation are set out in Annex C. 
 
The options for developing an organisational structure for implementation are 
discussed in more detail in the following section.
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Figure 5/2. Outline Strategic Works Plan for Scenario 2 
Figure 5/2 shows the outline strategic works plan for Scenario 2 (a 10 year program) as presented above. The key points to note 
are that the expatriate involvement could be reduced once the surge capacity is fully trained, and that all operations after 2014 
would be fully staffed and funded by Lao PDR resources. 
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Outline Staffing Requirement
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Figure 5/3. Outline staffing/funding profile for planning scenarios 
This graph shows the staffing/funding profile for the three planning scenarios presented above. For outline planning purposes, it is 
assumed at this stage that the funding levels would correlate with the numbers of staff hired, though as noted in this document there 
are several technical or procedural innovations that may achieve the same clearance targets with less staff. Cost effectiveness 
issues are considered below at Annex B. 
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5.4 Short-term planning: recovery from crisis 
 
It will take a while to make the detailed plans needed to put some flesh on the 
bones of the outlines set out here. Initial estimates are around 4-5 months to 
develop the plan, with time needed after that to mobilise resources. It is estimated 
that the ten-year plan discussed above could be implemented around the 
beginning of 2004.  
 
In the meantime, there will be need for a short-term plan for activity by the 
program while the long-term plans are being developed. This should set out the 
requirement necessary to protect the current assets of the program and the 
investment that has already been made in equipment and training.  UNDP reports 
that there is funding to maintain current levels of staff till the end of the third 
quarter of 2003. However, if the project is be funded to the levels necessary to 
clear the major development targets described above it will be particularly 
important to re-recruit as many of the laid off staff as possible, as soon as 
possible, in order to prevent de-skilling of this element of the workforce. With a 
good plan with good targets, improved organisational structure and improved 
resource mobilisation the program should be able to meet its funding targets 
 
 
Annexes to Section 5: 
 
A. JICA Planning Map: UXO Contamination and Potential Lowland Rice  
B. Maximising Cost Effectiveness  
C. Identifying Priorities 
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6. Ideas for organisational change 
This section includes notes on 
• Separating coordination from implementation 
• Notes on the possible role for UNDP 
• Options for new structures 
• Notes on the proposed new structure for implementing organisations 
 
6.1 Identifying parameters 
The previous sections have set out the issues facing the Lao UXO clearance 
program, and lay out some ideas for defining the strategic targets at which the 
program should aim. There remain two major questions: 
• What is the best organisational structure to meet these targets? 
• What are the options for funding a successful program? 
 
The team has identified a number of options that may serve as a basis for 
discussion. These options are set out in this section of the report. Options for 
funding are addressed in the following section (Section 7). 
 
In considering options, the team has considered the likelihood that each structure 
can address the issues identified earlier, especially: 
 
• Improving transparency and donor confidence 
 
• Improving efficiency in processes and reducing procedural blockages 
 
• Improving coordination and communication 
 
6.1.1 Coordination and implementation issues 
 
All of the options considered by the team shared one common theme, which is the 
need to separate the functions of planning, regulation and coordination from 
implementation. The main reasons for this are to place more importance on the 
need for coordination and that regulatory functions of government should be 
independent.  However, it is important to stress that the process of dividing 
coordinator from implementer is unlikely to be sufficient, by itself, to meet all donor 
concerns, as many donors have made it clear to the team that they would rather 
fund implementer organisations directly and/or they cannot fund UXO LAO staff 
directly as long as they are considered to be government personnel. This 
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separation of coordinator from implementer is a necessary initial stage to further 
structural change.  
 
Recommendation: that the planning, coordination and regulatory functions 
of UXO LAO be administratively separate from implementation.  
 
In making these changes it will be important to resolve the confusion over the 
overlapping coordination roles undertaken by/mandated to UXO LAO and the 
National Steering Committee Office (NSCO). It is proposed that the coordination 
body encompass many functions currently undertaken by UXO LAO and also the 
secretariat function.  This would accord with Prime Minister’s Decree No 75 by 
maintaining the steering committee secretariat function within a coordinating 
agency.  . In principle, people should be reallocated along with their function. For 
example the team who currently manage the database would move to the 
coordinating body where the database would reside.  
 
More detail on developing coordination is set out in more detail at Annex A, whilst 
the two options for implementation structures are covered in Annexes B and C. 
 
6.1.2 Reaffirming Lao leadership 
 
At first glance some of these ideas it may appear that it is being suggested that the 
existing ‘implementing partners’ are being given control over the program. This is 
simply not so. In fact, the ideas are intended to reinforce and reaffirm Lao 
leadership by focussing on the development of strategic capacity in management, 
planning and coordinating. The development of clear guidelines for the 
involvement of the existing implementing partners (and indeed any new mine 
action service providers) should help set the parameters for appropriate 
decentralisation in line with the current policy of the Government of Lao. 
 
Some ideas for ensuring the primacy of Lao managerial involvement are set out in 
more detail below at Annex D. 
 
6.1.3 Donor relationships and UNDP role 
 
For the purposes of clarity, donor contractual relationships with implementers 
and/or UNDP and the Lao UXO Trust Fund are not shown in the diagrams below. 
The following points cover the potential for the development of the role and 
activities of UNDP: 
 
• UNDP should continue to assist in resource mobilisation for the program. 
 
• UNDP could develop the role that it has with the Lao UXO Trust Fund to 
ensure that it is monitoring all stages of the program on behalf of donors. This 
should involve all elements of quality management in order to build donor 
confidence in the management of their donations.  
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• UNDP could assist with the provision of high-level technical advice and 
program support to the new coordination body. One key position that requires 
further technical assistance is the Finance Manager.  If current funding 
arrangements through Norwegian People’s Aid lapse, UNDP should consider 
funding this position.   
 
• UNDP can assist the Government of Lao with taking the message about the 
contamination problem and the clearance program to the international 
community. UNDP could assist in the production of a briefing package that 
could be used in UN Headquarters and by Lao PDR embassies worldwide. 
UNDP could also assist in arranging field visits for donor representatives.  
 
A possible logical framework for UNDP activity is included at Annex E. 
 
Annexes to Section 6: 
 
A. Developing more effective coordination 
B. Option One - Decentralised Implementation 
C. Option Two - decentralised implementation with centralised service support 
D. Developing partnerships in service provision 
E. UNDP assistance to UXO coordination body in Lao PDR: Logical Framework
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7. Towards sustainable funding 
 
There are several steps that could be undertaken to improve the programs 
success in resource mobilisation. These include: 
 
• Making use of a strategic action plan 
• Seeking other funding sources 
• Cost recovery 
• Development related project design 
• Loans 
 
These are each discussed below. 
 
7.1 Making use of a strategic action plan 
 
In the absence of a single donor willing to provide funding for the entire range 
of projects necessary to complete clearance of priority areas in a ten year time 
period, it is proposed that a strategic action plan be formulated to break the 
task of implementation into smaller elements that could be funded and 
managed as separate activities.  This is essentially an extension of the current 
approach where different NGOs work in different provinces and other 
agencies have clearly identified roles in community awareness and training.   
 
A planned approach is needed to attract international support, ensure 
community confidence, set priorities in descending order and develop a 
participatory approach to securing government financial support. 
 
The major change is that the coordinating agency takes a strategic and 
proactive role in defining projects and seeking funds.  There are many 
countries seeking support for mine clearance and Lao must define its priorities 
and make them available to appropriate donors.  The aim should be a 
strategic ten-year plan for coordinated UXO clearance activity in Lao PDR.  
 
A graphical representation of a possible structure for a strategic action plan is 
set out above at Figure 5/1 in Section 5. The diagram shows how the action 
plan can be divided into a number of different sized projects ranging from 
UXO clearance and roving teams to media awareness, education and training 
and other options currently not considered in the context of UXO projects. 
Each unit can then be developed into short proposals for presentation to 
donors. These could include a description of the project, identification of 
benefits to local communities as well as the donor agency, and a brief costing. 
Proposals should also provide information on various funding mechanisms 
including use of the UNDP Trust Fund, or the option of working directly with 
an NGO.  
 
The output of this part of the process would be a selection of projects, with 
varying aims, tasks and costs.  Donors have different interests and priorities, 
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some view UXO clearance as a humanitarian issue, whilst others would be 
more likely to link their support with development outcomes.  Donors also 
have different budgets; different time horizons for projects and some can offer 
differing in-kind support.  Some donors may have expertise in training, others 
in community awareness and others in demining activities.  The short 
proposals are intended to match opportunities with donor agencies. This is a 
significant change from the current approach to soliciting donor support and 
will require more effort. There is a risk that it is very labour intensive for the 
Coordination Agency and adequate resources will be needed to ensure that 
the process is equitable.  Nevertheless, this approach allows each project to 
be developed within the constraints of the donor agency, and, once donor 
interest is established, proposals can be finalised by, or in consultation with, 
sponsors. 
 
7.2 Seeking other funding sources 
 
The plan will also provide a basis for approaching funding agencies not 
currently supporting activities in Lao PDR.   These include the embassies that 
fund development projects in Lao PDR but have not funded UXO clearance, 
other UN mine action programs such as ‘Adopt a Minefield’ and private 
foundations. In short, the program should be more proactive in its research of 
potential donors.  
 
7.3 Cost recovery 
 
A further element of the project is to further develop cost recovery in mine 
action. Although the possibility of UXO LAO undertaking cost recovery 
activities has been raised on many occasions, the agency has not taken its 
focus away from its narrow focus on humanitarian functions.  Cost recovery 
offers an opportunity to maintain staffing levels, to raise funds for other 
clearance activity and to meet broader community and development 
objectives.  UXO LAO has been approached to undertake paid work in the 
past, an indication that there is a willingness to employ UXO LAO and provide 
funding for the organisation to diversify its activities. It could be entirely 
possible that area clearance work could be carried out in support of funded 
agricultural development projects.  Indeed, as area clearance is expensive 
and slow it is vital to ensure that any land cleared is going to be put to use 
immediately. One way to do that is to ensure that the development of that land 
is already funded; by extension, if the proper cost benefit analysis of the whole 
project (demining and development) has been done it should be possible to 
include the cost of area clearance as a line item on the cost of the 
development project. This would also engage other actors, i.e. the 
development agencies, as fund mobilisers for the clearance.  
 
If the use of cost recovery could be developed extensively (and again this 
depends on the development of a strategic action plan) then it would be 
possible to use funds mobilised for more general, ‘emergency’ projects to 
Assessment mission of the Lao UXO Trust Fund and the UXO LAO Mine Action Programme 
  
 
 38 DRAFT 
support casualty reduction, i.e. the roving teams and community awareness 
projects. 
 
One current constraint  that UXO LAO is not permitted to use any of the 
resources provided to it for humanitarian purposes to be used for commercial 
outcomes.  However, an extension of current financial management practices 
to accrual accounting would allow the full cost of each activity to be 
assessed25.   
 
There are two related issues to resolve: 
 
• The first is to determine what is actually meant by ‘humanitarian’ mine 
action. At the moment, essential development tasks for communities, such 
as infrastructure, are not normally undertaken by UXO LAO teams. This 
could mean that a village can have its land cleared but can not get water to 
that land because UXO LAO cannot support the clearance of an irrigation 
project. Many development agencies have already addressed this issue. 
For example, in the Balkans the World Bank supported most infrastructure 
projects but did not support telecommunications projects because the high 
rate of return on investment meant that the project would attract 
commercial investment and so bank development loans were 
unnecessary. A similar approach could be taken with area clearance in 
Lao PDR. In other words, infrastructure that is going to benefit Lao PDR as 
a whole but is not making a commercial profit (such as road construction) 
could be undertaken by an arm of the program providing the necessary 
accrual accounting procedures were in place.  
 
• The second is to determine how to incorporate wholly commercial projects 
into the program. It may be possible for an element of the program to be 
set aside for commercial work (providing they were not using resources 
intended for humanitarian activity) on profit making projects such as 
telecommunications or mineral extraction. This could easily be done by 
contract26; licensing requirements could ensure the commercial projects 
would bear the full cost of the mine action carried out on their behalf. 
Furthermore, the surplus generated by the commercial arm would then be 
put into the Trust Fund. 
 
                                                
25
 A further benefit of accrual accounting is that all activities are fully costed and should 
ensure that all operations are cost effective.  One example is that, under current 
administrative arrangements UXO LAO implementation activities are managed at a provincial 
level and roving teams do not cross provincial borders.  If a UXO is reported to be within close 
proximity to a roving team, that team cannot respond to a request to cross provincial 
boundaries.  By contrast, if activities were fully costed reciprocal arrangements could be 
made for emergency clearance tasks.   
26
 Commercial clearance work does not have to be done by an existing part of the program. 
Clearance contracts can be let by open, competitive tendering amongst commercial demining 
contractors and the customer can pay a licence fee as part of the clearance contract that 
would then be passed on by the contractor to the coordinating body. As part of the licencing 
process the coordinating body can assist the customer with project design and even provide 
independent quality assurance on a cost recovery basis. 
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There is a lot of work to be done to set up a transparent and cost effective 
cost recovery program; this does not mean that it cannot be done, and the 
high volume of funding currently going into infrastructure projects could 
contribute greatly to reducing the overall costs of the humanitarian elements 
of the UXO clearance program. 
 
 
 
7.4 Development related project design 
 
 Many suggestions have been made to link UXO clearance with development 
outcomes including provision of bonded training in electronics and vehicle 
maintenance, training team medics to provide basic health clinics in a nearby 
village or, in the case of Xieng Khouang, the establishment of a UXO Museum 
to boost the local economy from tourists who currently visit the Plain of Jars.  
Training in agricultural techniques could also maximise benefits from cleared 
land. These would have the benefit of being able to attract funds for elements 
of the program from new sources (bonded training in electronics could help 
the maintenance of the program’s equipment, for example). Such projects 
would also have the additional benefit of raising the profile of the program.   
 
 
7.5 Loans 
 
The final possible funding source to be considered is the possibility of 
structural loans provided by the World Bank or Asian Development Bank. This 
could be particularly interesting to the government towards the end of the 
proposed 10 year concentrated clearance program set out in this report, as a 
means for funding the sustainable element of the program once donations 
cease. 
 
There is an impact to Lao PDR on adding to its existing debt profile. However, 
the cost of the UXO program even at today’s cost is small compared to some 
of the major infrastructure loans already in place. Furthermore, a more 
detailed cost benefit analysis of the opportunity cost of uncleared land could 
make a good case for such a loan.  It is recommended that a structural loan 
for clearance be considered as part of the strategic planning process. 
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8. Conclusions 
As reported above, the UXO program in Lao PDR has been very successful in 
establishing and developing the technical capacity to deal with UXO 
contamination. However, the current program still faces a funding crisis and, 
although the changing situation in other parts of the world means that some 
funding is going elsewhere, there are still significant funds that would be 
available to the program in Lao if only a number of issues could be resolved. 
The issues are reported at length in the body of this report, but can be 
summarised as being concerns about: 
• Planning and prioritisation 
• Lao Government support 
• Organisational structure27 
Some donors have made it very clear that fundamental reforms need to be 
made if funding is to be made available. The report has made a number of 
recommendations for approaches that could address these issues and 
therefore could help allow sufficient funds to flow to allow the program to 
function effectively. This mission has attempted to clarify the current situation 
on behalf of the stakeholders and prepare the ground for the donors and the 
Government of Lao to agree on the most suitable way forwards. 
However, one main conclusion that can be drawn from these findings is that 
there is a need to take a strategic approach to addressing the issues. There 
appears to be no simple fix, nor any one or two small procedural adjustments 
that can be made to ‘tweak’ the status quo arrangements. On the other hand, 
it is also worth pointing out that there is no technical reason why any of these 
changes cannot be made. There is a lot of expertise available in the UXO 
LAO program and UNDP have already undertaken to help provide additional 
expertise if it is required. 
In particular, it is worth stressing that any strategy that is adopted must focus 
on the impact that the program is having on the wider development of Lao 
PDR rather than on the narrow measurements of performance indicators such 
as numbers of bombs disposed of or even hectares of land cleared. Given the 
huge distribution of contamination and the limited resources at hand, even in 
the most generous funding environment, it will be vital to establish a robust 
and transparent prioritisation mechanism that optimises socio-economic 
benefits and cost effectiveness. 
                                                
27
 In particular the requirement that Lao national staff are employed by UXO LAO which is 
viewed by donors as a government agency 
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Annex A to Section 3: UXO LAO Income, 1996-2001 
Year 
1996-1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Ser Contributor 
Contribution (US$) 
Total 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (i) 
Un–earmarked 
1 Australia  470,595   198,675             669,270  
2 Canada      135,762   100,833    95,074      331,669  
3 Finland     290,135       290,957        581,092  
4 Japan      242,924          242,924  
5 Luxembourg      34,747   220,000   250,000   250,000  754,747  
6 Netherlands     300,000   500,000     471,220   500,000  1,771,220  
7 New Zealand     303,758       20,000     103,500  427,258  
8 Norway     933,952   398,406   380,228   276,395   279,230  2,268,211  
9 South Korea           -  
10 Interest       96,664   182,243   112,733    153,601  545,241  
11 Subtotal un–earmarked  2,395,104  1,314,071  1,111,647  1,389,405  1,381,405  7,591,632 
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Earmarked 
12 Denmark     2,739,833    396,224   3,136,057  
13 Denmark 400,000           400,000  
14 USA   100,000  360,000    882,000   1,342,000  
15 Sweden 394,176          394,176  
16 USA   750,000        750,000  
17 Belgium   394,737            394,737  
18 New Zealand 132,506   81,624  70,036  74,309  77,706  436,181  
19 United Kingdom 138,020              138,020  
20 Australia 369,173          369,173  
21 Luxembourg     220,000         220,000  
22 Canada 182,482          182,482  
23 Japan                           -    
24 Norway 356,000              356,000  
25 Subtotal earmarked 1,972,357  1,326,361  3,389,869  74,309  1,355,930  8,118,826 
26 Total Income though the Lao PDR UXO Trust Fund 15,710,458 
 
Other contributions 
Year 
1996-1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Ser Contributor 
Contribution (US$) 
Total 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (i) 
27 UNDP 400,000          400,000  
28 UNDP    1,720,000          1,720,000  
29 UNICEF        224,048  267,272  491,320  
30 Miscellaneous     124,385  389,045  368,524  881,954  
31 Subtotal other  2,120,000   -    124,385   613,093   635,796   3,493,274  
32 Total Other Income  3,493,274 
33 Total by year 6,487,461   2,640,432   4,625,901   2,076,807   3,373,131  19,203,732 
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Annex B to Section 3: UXO LAO Expenditure, 1996-2001 
Year 
1996-1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Ser Contributor 
Contribution (US$) 
Total 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (i) 
Un–earmarked expenditure 
1 Australia 200,000  218,714  221,999  28,567    669,270  
2 Canada       236,595  95,074  331,669  
3 Finland   84,135  20,000    290,957  581,092  
4 Japan       242,924    242,924  
5 Luxembourg   34,747  37,257  432,743  250,000  754,747  
6 Netherlands 200,000  100,000  30,500  259,552  532,712  1,452,764  
7 New Zealand 138,816  1,292  108,805  74,845  103,500  427,258  
8 Norway 210,584  871,774  459,346  447,277  279,230  2,268,211  
9 South Korea             
10 Interest       351,043  318,528  669,571  
11 Subtotal un–earmarked  749,400  1,310, 652  1,393,907  2,073,546  1,870,001  7,397,506 
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12 Denmark   1,190,831  424,443  921,080  586,582  3,122,936 
 
13 Denmark           400,000      400,000 
 
14 USA   100,000      787,471       887,471 
 
15 Sweden 394,176           394,176 
 
16 USA       51,500  92,172  143,672 
 
17 Belgium 211,818  182,919         394,737 
 
18 New Zealand 71,248  87,305  73,219  74,375  70,081  376,228 
 
19 United Kingdom 138,020          138,020 
 
20 Australia   250,107  119,066      369,173 
 
21 Luxembourg     140,798  79,202    220,000 
 
22 Canada 39,416  123,038  20,028      182,482 
 
23 Japan            - 
 
24 Norway   301,000  55,000      356,000  
25 Subtotal earmarked 854,678   2,235,200   1,232,554   1,126,157   1,536,306   6,984,895 
 
26 Total Expenditure from the Lao PDR UXO Trust Fund 14,382,401
 
Other expenditure 
Year 
1996-1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Ser Contributor 
Contribution (US$) 
Total 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (i) 
27 UNDP Adm. Chg. 46,721  103,277  76,499   93,195  99,213  418,905  
28 UNDP  400,000          400,000  
29 UNDP 524,982  1,175,046  12,649  7,323    1,720,000  
30 UNICEF     74,689  197,082  235,076  506,847  
31 Miscellaneous       194,773  447,965  642,738  
32 Subtotal other  924,982  1,175,046  87,338  399,178   683,041  3,269,585 
33 Total Other Expenditure  3,269,585 
34 Total by year 2,529,060  4,720,898  2,713,799  3,598,881  4,089,348 17,651,986 
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Annex C to Section 3: Balances Brought Forward, 1996-2001 
 
Year 
1996-1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Ser Contributor 
Contribution (US$) 
Total 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (i) 
Carry over from Un–earmarked funds 
1 Australia 270,595  250,566  28,567                -                  -      
2 Canada               -                    -    135,762                -                  -      
3 Finland 290,135  206,000                -    290,957                -      
4 Japan               -                    -    242,924                -                  -      
5 Luxembourg               -                    -    182,743                -                  -      
6 Netherlands 100,000  500,000  139,500  351,168      318,456    
7 New Zealand 164,942  163,650  74,845                -                  -      
8 Norway 723,368  250,000  170,882                -                 -      
9 South Korea             
10 Interest 96,664  278,907  391,640  40,597     (124,330)    
11 Subtotal un–earmarked  1,645,704  1,649,123  1,366,863  682,722  194,126   
Carry over from earmarked funds 
12 Denmark   -    (1,190,831)  1,124,559  203,479  13,121   
 
13 Denmark  400,000  400,000      -      -      -     
 
14 USA    -     -       -       -      -     
 
15 Sweden   750,000  1,110,000  1,058,500  1,060,857   
 
16 USA (211,818)  -       -       -       -     
 
17 Belgium  61,258  55,577  52,394  52,328  59,953   
 
18 New Zealand    -    -       -       -       -     
 
19 United Kingdom 369,173  119,066      -      -        -     
 
20 Australia     -    -    79,202    -         -     
 
21 Luxembourg 143,066  20,028     -      -       -     
 
22 Canada            
 
23 Japan  356,000  55,000  -    -    -   
 
24 Norway             
25 Subtotal earmarked 1,117,679  208,840   2,366,155   1,314,307   1,133,931   
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Carry over from other contributions 
Year 
1996-1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Ser Contributor 
Contribution (US$) 
Total 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (i) 
26 UNDP     -       -       -     -      -   
 
  
27 UNDP  1,195,018  19,972  7,323    -    -   
 
  
28 UNICEF     -       -     (74,689)   (47,723)  (15,527) 
 
  
29 Miscellaneous    -      -    124,385  318,657   239,216 
 
  
30 Subtotal other  1,195,018  19,972  57,019  270,934  223,689   
31 Total by year  3,958,401   1,877,935   3,790,037   2,267,963   1,551,746  
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Annex D to Section 3: Summary of Expenditure Breakdown for UXO LAO, 1996-2001 
 
Year 
1996-1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Ser Expenditure 
  
National Intl. National Intl. National Intl. National Intl. National Intl. 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) 
1 Personnel Cost         218,797     296,134     856,349     267,164  1,376,279     347,426  1,631,180     398,100 
2 Income Tax             164,596       261,259       336,061   
3 Operating Cost      3,492,695       231,972       371,271       587,134   
4 Supplies             118,863       312,797       270,036   
5 Equipment         611,785         51,985         84,254         95,117   
7 Unspecified      2,477,862                    
8 Implementing Partners             945,598       700,000       250,831   
9 Special Projects                   52,400       421,675   
10 UN Support           46,720        105,520         76,499         93,195         99,213   
11 Total      2,524,582     4,724,931    2,713,026    3,598,881    4,089,347 
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Annex A to Section 5: JICA Planning Map28: UXO Contamination and 
Potential Lowland Rice  
 
                                                
28
 This map is Figure 4.3 in Part One of the JICA Report 
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Annex B Section 5: Maximising cost effectiveness 
 
Although the above scenarios set out the general implications of funding 
levels on clearance rates, it is not suggested that the program should merely 
be funded to work in a ‘business as usual’ manner. There are a number of 
technical and procedural innovations that could be considered as means to 
increase cost effectiveness. These are set out below. 
 
• An objective evaluation of available brush cutting machinery that could 
help release deminers from cutting vegetation and maximise the time 
available for actual clearance. 
 
• An objective evaluation of the potential to use villagers to clear vegetation 
on clearance tasks instead of using deminers29. If successful, this could be 
used in conjunction with brush cutting machinery.  
 
• A trial of some of the techniques already being considered in Xieng 
Khouang Province to use villagers to assist with the less technical 
elements of the search process. With the right training and procedures it 
may be possible to greatly increase the rate of clearance by having UXO 
LAO deminers each supervising a number of civilian searchers. 
 
• A trial of dogs as a means for searching for UXO contamination which may 
be able to speed up clearance rates, particularly in areas of high metal 
contamination where mine detectors react to false alarms. 
 
• There may be other areas that could improve cost effectiveness on a 
smaller scale that, incrementally, could contribute significant savings. For 
example:  
 
o Greater use of shaped charge demolition techniques could help the 
teams reduce the amount of explosive used on each bomb.  
 
o It is recommended that the program consider amalgamating the role 
of survey teams and roving teams and reorganise them into 3-
person EOD teams with a team leader, team member and 
driver/medic30. The amalgamation of the survey and roving team 
would save the extra journeys (and hence delay) between survey 
and clearance of spot tasks. 
 
                                                
29
 Discussion with WFP suggests that it may also be possible to provide incentives for the 
involvement of villagers in the project as an extension of the WFP ‘Food for Work’ project in 
that is already under way in Lao PDR. 
30
 The team leader could determine whether any reported task was suitable for them (i.e. was 
a ‘spot’ task) or whether it needed systematic area clearance. Once this analysis was 
complete, the team leader, who would be a more qualified EOD technician, could then deal 
with the spot task with the assistance of the team member. The driver would not need to be 
EOD qualified but should be a qualified medic able to give assistance in the event of a UXO 
accident.  
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o  There should be a re-evaluation of the team structure to address 
the number of people that re left ‘standing idle’ during clearance 
tasks. This is particularly important in times of reduced funding and 
reduced staffing. This re-evaluation should be able to identify those 
people who are required for emergency reasons, such as the 
medics. Additionally, it may highlight the potential for redeploying 
the additional drivers and team leaders.  
 
o A related question of cost effectiveness would be to see if it was 
possible to develop the role of the site medics so that they could 
provide medical clinic services to the surrounding villages whilst 
working at the locations. This would add more value to the local 
area and also ensure that the medics did not get ‘out of practice’ in 
the (thankfully) long periods between UXO accidents.  
 
If it was possible to introduce a culture of innovation it may be possible to 
identify and trial other such ideas throughout the life of the program and work 
on means to increase cost effectiveness. 
Assessment mission of the Lao UXO Trust Fund and the UXO LAO Mine Action Programme 
  
 
  DRAFT xviii 
 
Annex C Section 5: Identifying priorities 
 
Within the overall framework of a strategic plan there is a need to develop 
prioritisation criteria to assist in the preparation of the annual works plan. This 
is important in the case of the UXO LAO program to develop donor 
confidence. In particular, there appears to be too much clearance carried out 
‘outside the plan’ Which implies that the planning process is not very effective.  
 
How then should this be addressed? Perhaps the first point to make here is 
that, in principle, UXO clearance agencies are not best qualified to determine 
priorities; this should be agreed by the development agencies and 
communities that the demining is intended to support, with appropriate 
technical advice from the demining agencies. Given the fact that UXO 
clearance assets are a scarce resource, it is vital that the agencies that 
coordinate development plans, have a prime role in determining the priority for 
clearance. Of course, there is also a very important role for the Provinces in 
prioritisation, and this becomes even more important given the Government of 
Lao policy of decentralisation. One way to achieve balance between the 
centre and the periphery in such issues is for the central government to 
establish clear planning criteria on which prioritisation by the provincial 
authorities can be based. Such criteria also provide a base for identifying 
performance indicators against which the program can be assessed. This also 
provides greater transparency, allows inputs to be measured against outputs 
and helps builds donor confidence in the program. 
 
Weighting mechanisms can be used to determine the appropriate distribution 
of roving and clearance teams between Provinces in an equitable manner. It 
may also be appropriate, in the case of area clearance teams, to consider the 
relative economic potential of each province.  
 
A second level of prioritisation can be based on socio-economic criteria, such 
as: 
 
• The number of people that will benefit from the task 
 
• The economic benefit that will accrue to the community 
 
• The cost of the clearance 
 
As a third level of prioritisation, it may be useful to take into account whether 
or not the development project that is planned to follow the clearance is 
actually funded. 
 
Once such criteria are established and endorsed by the appropriate central 
authorities, provincial authorities, managers of the UXO program and donors 
can use them to ensure that the most deserving tasks are selected. 
Furthermore, post clearance follow-up monitoring activity can be undertaken 
to ensure that the land is actually being used for the stated purpose. 
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The cost benefit analyses that have already been carried out on the work of 
the UXO LAO program may also provide more detailed guidance on the 
development of transparent and effective prioritisation criteria. 
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Annex A Section 6: Developing more effective coordination 
 
It is recommended that the ‘coordination’ body should take on all of the following 
functions31: 
  
• Advice on UXO Policy for the Government of Lao PDR, including provision of 
secretariat function to top level government representatives in the national 
steering committee32 
 
• Regulating implementers, including development of M OU (in cooperation with 
relevant donor representatives) and licensing arrangements 
 
• Setting technical standards for all mine action activities in Lao PDR 
 
• Development of strategic plans (such as the 10 year action plan recommended 
in the previous section of this report) and annual works plans, including 
coordination of resource mobilisation 
 
• Provision of prioritisation guidelines to provincial authorities 
 
• Coordination of all Mine Action activity in Lao PDR, including: 
 
o All demining, including emergency response and demining in support of 
development and all commercial demining 
 
o Community awareness 
 
o Victim assistance 
 
• Quality management, quality assurance and quality control, including audit, 
monitoring and accident investigation functions 
 
• Preparation and dissemination of public information material at a national level 
 
• Management of national UXO database 
 
Funds will be needed to ensure that the coordinating body is able to fulfil its duties.  
These could be raised through direct support from a donor, through a small levy 
on the value of each project or through a license fee. Further input from donors 
and the Government of Lao will be needed to agree on an appropriate mechanism.
                                                
31
 This concept assumes that appropriate decision-making powers will be delegated to the 
coordination body and to the implementing organisations. 
32
 This concept assumes that higher-level decision-making will be extended to involve existing 
cross sector coordination bodies such as the CPC and to provide donors with a means to be 
represented  
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Annex B Section 6: Option One - Decentralised Implementation 
 
The first structural option is based on the development of a small coordination 
body that is fully staffed and supported as described above presiding over a 
number of decentralised implementing partners. 
 
Implementation 
 
In this option, implementers would report o the coordination organisation while 
also taking on full responsibility for management of their own projects, within the 
terms of reference of their MOU, including: 
 
• Assisting with fundraising/resource mobilisation for their projects 
 
• Developing a works plan within their strategic targets, including preparation of 
a comprehensive exit strategy for international involvement 
 
• Managing their own project finance 
 
• Recruiting and paying for their own staff and training them to meet standards33 
 
• Providing and maintaining their own equipment 
 
This option builds on the successful steps taken to standardise key practices, such 
as technical operating procedures, salary levels and national planning. It also 
decentralises the program in line with Government of Lao policy whilst also 
recognising donor preferences. It is also a project that remains firmly under Lao 
management34.  
Advantages 
 
This option has the advantages of 
 
• Clear separation of responsibilities between regulator and implementer 
 
• Being the structure that is most responsive to donor preferences, particularly in 
terms of transparency, cost effectiveness and efficiency. 
Disadvantages 
 
This option would require considerable change. 
 
                                                
33
 There are some sub-options that can be considered in regards to training. For example, it may be 
possible that the training can be brought in from a specialised service provider. This is also 
considered in the options considered below. 
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Implementing
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Implementing
organisation
Implementing
organisation
Implementing
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Note: the actual number of
implementation
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Boxes with heavy
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decentralised implementation
Option One
Each implementing organisation would be responsible for
developing the element of the project that would be
sustainable after the end of international funding
Government
of Lao
 
Figure 6/1. Outline organisation chart for Option One
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Annex C Section 6: Option Two - decentralised implementation with 
centralised service support 
 
This option has separate, decentralised implementing organisations for mine 
actions services, with a central organisation providing support services including 
recruiting, training and equipment. 
 
Advantages 
 
• This option has many of the advantages of Option One, in that includes the 
same separation of responsibilities between regulator/coordinator and 
implementers. 
 
• It has a potential additional advantage in that it provides a central body for the 
provision of support services, which could provide greater economies of scale 
than having each implementer provide these services separately 
 
Disadvantages 
 
• It is not yet proven that centralised service provision would actually be more 
cost-effective. 
 
• Implementers using central services would still be responsible for meeting 
standards, so may feel it necessary to introduce parallel structures in order to 
ensure that they can meet contractual obligations.  
 
• It might be difficult to design the service provider to ensure that services were 
provided in such a way as to meet donor preferences, especially if staff were 
still considered as government employees.  
 
• It would not meet the requirements of many donors unless there is an 
opportunity for NGOs to recruit staff directly  
 
Recommendation: that Option One be adopted as the model for implementation 
arrangements 
 
Option One is recommended as it has the greatest potential to attract donor funds 
and realise the ten-year plan.  If option 1 is not possible to implement, 
consideration should be given to the second option, noting that progress will be 
severely limited unless there is flexibility for donors and NGOs to recruit staff 
directly.    
Assessment mission of the Lao UXO Trust Fund and the UXO LAO Mine Action Programme DRAFT 
  DRAFT xxi 
Supplier:
logistics
personnel
training
Implementing
organisation
Implementing
organisation
Implementing
organisation
Implementing
organisation
Implementing
organisation
Note: the actual number of
implementation
organisations may vary
Boxes with heavy
borders represent
the sustainable
element of the
program
decentralised implementation with centralised service support
Option Two
Each implementing organisation would be responsible
for developing the element of the project that would be
sustainable after the end of international funding
Steering Committee
Coordination
Body
Government
of Lao
Some implementing
organisations may contract
their own staff directly
 
Figure 6/2. Outline organisation chart for Option Two 
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Annex D Section 6: Developing partnerships in service provision 
 
As stated above, it seems necessary to separate the functions of planning, 
regulation and coordination from those of implementing identifying options for 
structural change in the UXO sector in Lao PDR.  
 
For an implementing organisation to be effective in such a system it will need to 
have sufficient ability to gather the resources to meet its targets. This requires 
some autonomy (over centralisation of decision making in the current UXO 
structure was a recurrent theme among many stakeholders) but this does not 
necessarily mean total independence. Indeed, both of the options set out above 
rely on the provision of strategic guidance from the coordination body. 
 
Similarly, because in the past within UXO LAO the term ‘implementing partners’ 
refers to foreign organisations (predominantly NGOs) it is easy to assume that 
these options refer to ‘foreign’ implementation. Again, this is not necessarily the 
case. 
 
The diagram below at Figure 6/3 outlines the essential partnership approach that 
is recommended.  
 
In this structure, the first step is the establishment of a relationship between a 
prospective donor and the Government of Lao, represented in this case by the 
Coordination Body. UNDP could be a valuable broker in this process. Between 
them they establish the modality by which the donor could support the program;, 
for example, the donor can select a project or an element of the program from the 
strategic action plan that fits in with the donor’s own funding strategies. 
 
The second step is for the donor and the coordination body to select an 
international NGO (or indeed a commercial service provider) to assist in the 
implementation of the selected project35. The NGO has a contract with the donor 
(perhaps via the UNDP Trust Fund) that provides an essential risk management 
strategy for the donor, as the NGO is then contractually obliged to meet the 
objectives of the contract. However, there is also a second element of control on 
the NGO, which is the MOU or licence issued to the NGO by the Coordination 
Body that sets out the relationship of the NGO to the Coordinating Body in terms 
of prioritisation of work, reporting and quality standards. There is a third 
requirement which is for the Coordination Body to undertake to provide whichever 
support and guidance is necessary for the NGO to undertake and complete its 
mission. Again, there is a valuable role for UNDP to play to help ensure that the 
terms of the MOU are compatible with the terms of the Contract. 
 
                                                
35
 As an aside here, there is no reason why the selection of implementing NGO/service provider 
cannot be done competitively. The use of a contracting process will ensure that all necessary 
standards can still be met and it may mean increased cost effectiveness for the program as a 
whole. At the very least it is compatible with the notion of increased transparency throughout the 
program. It is also felt that the principle of having a number of different NGO/service providers is 
valuable and every effort should be undertaken to ensure that a monopoly situation does not 
develop. Furthermore, there is no technical reason why other potential service providers outside 
the existing group of NGO/service providers cannot be included in the selection process. 
Assessment mission of the Lao UXO Trust Fund and the UXO LAO Mine Action Programme DRAFT 
  Annex D 
 
  DRAFT xxiii
Once the NGO/service provider has its contract and MOU, it can then work with 
the Coordination Body to select a Project Manager who is a Lao national.  This 
process is important as it helps ensure that this approach adds to genuine 
capacity building in terms of project management. The NGO/service provider can 
then work together on a collaborative process to select the individuals who are to 
provide the technical assistance to the project36. 
 
Once the project management team are established, they can then themselves 
work on building the rest of the project unit structure. 
 
This approach provides a balance between securing donor interest in terms of 
financial accountability and transparency and developing strategic project 
management capacity amongst the Lao nationals working on the project. This is 
vital, not only to meet the valid Government of Lao concerns that the UXO 
program must not pose a threat to security, but to ensure that, at a point where the 
overall exit strategy for international involvement means that the project is entirely 
in Lao hands, the implementing units have the capacity to run themselves. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
36
 The number of technical advisors and type of technical assistance they provide can vary with the 
nature of the project and the stage the project reaches on its lifecycle. For example, it is reasonable 
to expect more technical assistance at a training stage, with a greatly reduced level once the 
training is complete and only monitoring is required.  
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Figure 6/3. Outline organisation chart for implementing organisation structure
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UNDP assistance to UXO coordination body in Lao PDR: Logical Framework 
 
Intervention Logic Objectively Verifiable Indicators Sources of 
Verification 
Assumptions 
Overall 
Objective 
Reduce the impact of UXO contamination in Lao 
PDR by: 
(1) Reducing casualties 
(2) Clearing land for development 
• Socio economic impact reduced 
• Casualty numbers reduced  
• Priority land cleared and being used 
Project 
Purpose 
To provide strategic assistance to the UXO 
coordination body in Lao PDR 
• Assistance provided 
• Coordination body functional 
Inception plan for coordination body developed • Inception plan circulated 
Coordination body established • Government of Lao authorisation 
Intermediate 
Results 
Strategic action plan developed • Plan circulated 
Provision of strategic advice to Government of 
Lao 
• Advice provided 
Provision of technical assistance to coordinating 
body on regulatory functions 
• Technical assistance provided 
• Regulatory framework developed 
Assistance with the development of technical 
standards 
• Assistance provided 
• Technical standards produced 
Assistance with the development of strategic 
action plans and prioritisation mechanisms 
• Assistance provided 
• Strategic action plan produced 
• Objective and transparent prioritisation 
mechanism in place 
Assistance with coordination • Assistance provided 
• Coordination effective 
Assistance with development and 
implementation of a quality framework 
• Quality management system in place in 
line with general principles of ISO 9000 
Assistance with preparation and dissemination 
of public information material 
• Public information prepared, disseminated 
and updated 
Assistance with developing a national UXO 
database 
• Database developed to include detailed 
records of all cleared areas 
Managing the Lao UXO Trust Fund, including 
independent program monitoring function on 
behalf of donors 
• Trust Fund managed to UNDP standards 
• Independent program monitoring function 
operational 
Activities 
Assisting donors • Assistance provided 
Development 
organisation 
reports 
 
Internal quality 
processes 
 
Annual progress 
reports 
 
External 
validation 
 
International 
Mine Action 
Standards 
 
ISO 9000 
 
UNDP 
Guidelines on 
Management of 
Trust Funds  
 
Restructuring 
concepts for 
UXO Program 
accepted and 
adopted 
 
UNDP project 
proposal 
accepted by 
Government of 
Lao 
 
UNDP project 
proposal 
accepted by 
donors and 
funding made 
available 
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